Egypt: inside Russia’s Arabic disinformation factory

As far as Sputnik is concerned, the locks of Syria’s Saydnaya prison never sprang open. Nowhere in the Arabic edition of this Russian state media outlet —  a key pillar of Kremlin propaganda — is there any mention of the thousands of prisoners freed following the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime on 8 December 2024. Even prior to this, during the dictator’s final 48 hours in power, Sputnik’s Arabic-language articles on Syria exclusively echoed the government’s official line, denying military setbacks and plans to evacuate the president.

As Vladimir Putin’s top ally in the Middle East, Bashar al-Assad was pampered by Moscow-controlled media until his downfall. And in 2015, the Kremlin’s propaganda machine installed an office in the Dokki district of Cairo, the Egyptian capital, to produce its influence campaign targeting Arab speakers. Ten years later, the staff has doubled and now counts around ten writers, most of them Egyptian, who cover international news for the state-run news agency RIA Novosti and the Sputnik website — always through the lens of Russia’s strategic interests in the Middle East.

In a region with widespread mistrust of the United States and its Western allies, Russian propaganda in Arabic has a considerable impact. Sputnik’s Arabic Telegram channel boasts over 155,000 subscribers, compared to just 35,000 for the Qatari news network Al Jazeera and 26,000 for the Saudi TV channel Al-Hadath.

Self-censorship in line with Kremlin foreign policy

From the moment the Cairo office opened — which coincided with Russia’s military intervention in support of Bashar al-Assad in September 2015 — Syria was the team’s primary focus. The editorial line was clear, and fully aligned with the rhetoric of the ruling Baathist regime in Damascus, the Syrian capital. “We were required to refer to the ‘White Helmets’ [a group of volunteers aiding civilians in rebel-held conflict zones known as the Syrian Civil Defence] as ‘terrorists.’ We didn’t publish anything about the regime’s chemical attacks or anything that could implicate Bashar al-Assad,” said a journalist who worked at the Cairo office for several years who will remain anonymous for security reasons.

However, “no direct orders come from Moscow headquarters,” our source claims. Instead, employees absorb the editorial stance of Russian state media and engage in a form of self-censorship. Another former employee, who will also remain anonymous, recalled being asked about Russia’s Middle Eastern policy during their job interview. “We covered briefings from the Russian Foreign Ministry, which more or less gave us our editorial guidelines,” our source explained. The only direct instruction from Moscow came in March 2022: afterRussia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, journalists across the network were prohibited from referring to Volodymyr Zelensky as the “president” of Ukraine.

Smearing the United States and its allies

In the Arabophone region, this Kremlin-backed editorial stance means the Cairo office focuses on negative news about the United States and its allies — standard practice across Russian state media. “During the military intervention of the Global Coalition against Daesh in Syria and Iraq, our reports emphasised the number of civilian casualties caused by coalition airstrikes,” the journalist explained.

Alongside the Cairo office, an Arabic-language team based in Moscow covers Russia and the former Soviet bloc. They are responsible for translating articles from Russian into Arabic, including those related to the "special military operation" in Ukraine — a term frequently echoed by other Russian media. 

This division of responsibilities between Cairo and Moscow allows the headquarters to oversee the coverage of sensitive topics that would otherwise fall under the Egyptian office’s jurisdiction. One journalist RSF spoke to recounted the censorship of stories on the severe wheat shortages that hit Egypt — one of the world’s largest wheat importers — after Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, which had been a key wheat supplier to Cairo. Another former journalist told RSF that mentioning the presence of mercenaries from the Russian Wagner Group in Africa — now rebranded as Africa Corps — was another editorial line that could not be crossed.

A tight-knit Middle Eastern network

Although they share the same office in Cairo, RIA Novosti and Sputnik operate under different structures, according to our inside sources. The RIA Novosti team focuses on monitoring news, centralising reports from freelance journalists in the region, and writing brief news items — described as more “technical” work that attracts less scrutiny from Moscow headquarters.

However, RIA Novosti plays a crucial role in disseminating the Kremlin’s worldview in the region. Though it lacks the global reach of Agence France Presse (AFP), Reuters, or the Associated Press (AP), it counts among its subscribers Arab state institutions in Russia and numerous regional media organisations, including: Egypt’s state newspaper Al-Ahram (subscribed since 2015), the Assad regime’s state propaganda outlet Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA), Algeria Press Service, and pro-Hezbollah Lebanese channel Al-Mayadeen (subscribed since 2016), Emirates News Agency, Palestinian news agency WAFA, and Morocco’s Maghreb Arab Press (MAP, subscribed since 2018), and Saudi Arabia’s Saudi Press Agency (SPA, subscribed since 2023).

Russia’s regional ambitions

Despite the clear editorial bias imposed on journalists, the Cairo office attracts skilled and qualified journalists thanks to salaries that exceed industry standards in Egypt, according to RSF findings. Several former employees of RIA Novosti and Sputnik in Cairo have since moved on to reputable international media outlets.

By taking advantage of the repeated devaluation of Egypt’s currency since 2016, Russia’s media network has been able to continually expand its local teams. RSF discovered that three new journalists are currently being recruited, indicating the Kremlin’s desire to wield more influence in the region.

What’s more, right now may be a particularly opportune time for the Kremlin’s media operations, as the rift between the West and the Arab world —  deepened by the war in Gaza — is only beginning to show its full depth.